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C O M P A R I N G
Urban Order and Rationality: Racially Coded Street Violence, Ra-
cial Projects and Practices of Comparing in Chicago 1919 
Klaus Weinhauer 
Abstracts 
This paper elaborates steps towards an approach which can bring about new insights about the 
racially coded street violence of July/August 1919 and about related problems in Chicago. Three 
interrelated perspectives are integrated: the social construction of race and racism based on ra-
cial projects, the triangular setting (perpetrator-victim-audience/third parties) of social conflict 
(including race/racism) and violence, and the study of practices of comparing. In 1919 there was a 
widely shared assumption of similarity (‘Gleichartigkeitsannahme’) which naturalized the differ-
ence between two distinct races (‘white’ and ‘negro’). The racial projects studied in this paper 
addressed different third parties/audiences. The press was no passive audience but an active third 
party which communicated the often localized patterns of racism to translocal audiences. The 
racial projects of the report of the Chicago Commission on Race Relations (CCRR) were shaped by 
progressive comparisons which focused on urban-based social-political progress and on advanced 
masculine rationality. The racial projects in Chicago were massively shaped by practices of com-
paring which tried to bring order and stability to a society whose white members felt themselves 
threatened through massive war-induced social change. 
 
Das Arbeitspapier entwickelt erste Schritte für einen Ansatz, der neue Einsichten vermitteln kann 
über die rassisch kodierte Straßengewalt in Chicago im Juli/August 1919 sowie über damit verbun-
dene Problemfelder. Verknüpft werden drei Perspektiven: die soziale Konstruktion von „race“ und 
Rassismus durch dezentrale „racial projects“, das triadische Setting Täter-Opfer-Dritte/Publikum 
sowie Vergleichspraktiken. 1919 gab es eine weithin geteilte Gleichartigkeitsannahme, durch die 
Unterschiede zwischen zwei klar unterscheidbaren „Rassen“ (Weiße und Schwarze) naturalisiert 
wurden. Die in vielen Gesellschaftsbereichen verankerten dezentralen „racial projects“ adressier-
ten ein weites Spektrum von lokalen bis hin zu translokalen Dritten/Publika. Die Presse, ein wich-
tiger und aktiver Dritter, kein passives Publikum, kommunizierte und ergänzte die oft lokal be-
grenzten rassistischen Muster an translokale Publika. Die im Bericht der Chicago Commission on 
Race Relations (CCRR) formulierten „racial projects“ nutzten progressive Vergleiche, ausgerichtet 
auf urban geprägten sozialen und politischen Fortschritt sowie auf fortschrittliche männliche Ra-
tionalität. Die „racial projects“ in Chicago waren untrennbar verbunden mit Vergleichspraktiken. 
Letztere sollten Ordnung und Stabilität in eine weiße städtische Gesellschaft bringen, die sich be-






After World War One a wave of social upheavals shook the world. Cities in Russia, the 
US, South America, India, the UK, and Germany became hotbeds of strikes, and other 
forms of collective action which massively fostered social change but also aroused wide-
spread social fears. While the activities of organizations like political parties and trade 
unions parliamentary politics are well-analyzed, we still lack studies which focus on 
what happened outside these formal organizations.1 In such a perspective street-based 
collective actions and social movements come into view. In order to analyze social 
change, a focus on cities as the main sites of collective action is an important starting 
point.2 We have at least some publications on European capitals which address such 
issues. In the USA social fears about instability and social change (through a vaguely 
defined bolshevism, a revolution or political enemies) massively spread. As we will see, 
these fears could also be racially coded. There are, however, only a few studies on US-
cities, which immediately after World War One went through a highly turbulent phase 
framed by big strikes and other social movement activities.  
Chicago is the big US-city which is extremely well-suited to be the focus of such a study. 
The windy city already had a reputation as a dynamic hotbed of social change, as a city 
of vice and working-class radicalism. It not only saw numerous strikes in the years im-
mediately following World War One. What makes Chicago the ideal city to focus on, 
however, is that here many massively violent street actions occurred, some of them 
racially coded, which gained nationwide attention. These confrontations escalated to 
 
1 See Robert Gerwarth/John Horne (eds.), War in Peace. Paramilitary violence in Europe after the Great 
War, Oxford 2013; Klaus Weinhauer/Anthony McElligott/Kirsten Heinsohn (eds.), Germany 1916-23. A 
revolution in context, Bielefeld 2015; Stefan Rinke/Michael Wildt (eds.), Revolutions and Counter-Rev-
olutions. 1917 and its aftermath from a global perspective, Frankfurt and New York 2017; James E. 
Cronin/Carmen Sirianni (eds.), Work, Community and Power. The experience of labor in Europe and 
America, 1900–1925, Philadelphia 1983; Leopold Haimson/Charles Tilly (eds.), Strikes, Wars, and Rev-
olutions in an International Perspective. Strike waves in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
Cambridge et al. 1989. 
2 See Tyler Stovall, Paris and the Spirit of 1919. Consumer struggles, transnationalism, and revolution, 
Cambridge et al. 2012; Michael Goebel, Anti-Imperialist Metropolis: Interwar Paris and the seeds of Third 
World nationalism, Cambridge et al. 2015. 
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violent street battles of an unprecedented scale which were initiated by whites and di-
rected against African-Americans.3 These racially coded violent street actions in summer 
1919 added massively to the city’s rough image. Through the activities of members of 
the Chicago school of sociology there are many high-quality contemporary publications 
which can be used as sources. Moreover, many historians have studied the racially 
coded street violence that happened in Chicago in July/August 1919. 
The publications on the violent confrontations of summer 1919, their aftermath and 
related social problems share two blind spots - one is related to the construction of race 
and racism, the other to the conceptualization of social conflict and violence. Most stud-
ies on collective action in Chicago in 1919 take race and racial tensions more or less as 
given facts. Until today the violent collective actions on the streets of Chicago in summer 
1919 are labelled as a “race riot”, following a terminology established by US newspapers 
in the early 1880s.4 This lack of reflection on the concept of race is astonishing, as re-
search on race and racism is flourishing not only in history (urban and labor history) 
but also in the social sciences.  
One of the most promising concepts for the study of race and racism has been elabo-
rated by Michael Omi and Howard Winant. As they have convincingly argued, in a pro-
cess they call “racialization” racial phenotypes such as “black and white have been con-
structed and encoded through the language of race”.5 This focus on the social construc-
tion of race is in line with most recent studies which see race as a “relationship, and not 
 
3 The state of research is summarized by: David Bates, The Ordeal of the Jungle. Race and the Chicago 
Federation of Labor 1903-1922, Carbondale 2019; David F. Krugler, 1919. The year of racial violence, 
New York 2015; Christopher Robert Reed, Knock at the Door of Opportunity. Black Migration to Chicago, 
1909-1919, Carbondale 2014; Christopher Lamberti, Riot Zone: Chicago 1919, Ph D dissertation Brown 
University 2013 (MS); Rick Halpern, Down on the Killing Floor. Black and white workers in Chicago’s 
packinghouses, 1904-54, Urbana and Chicago 1997; William M. Tuttle jr., Race Riot. Chicago in the Red 
Summer of 1919, Urbana and Chicago 1970. See on the important context of prohibition Thomas 
Welskopp, Amerikas große Ernücherung. Eine Kulturgeschichte der Prohibition, Paderborn 2010.  
4 Michael Banton, In Defence of Mainstream Sociology, in: Ethnic and Racial Studies 36 (2013), pp. 1000-
1004, p. 1002. See for critical discussion of the term “race riot” Janet L. Abu-Lughod, Race, Space, and 
Riots in Chicago, New York, and Los Angeles, Oxford 2007, p. 11f. As the analytical capacity of the term 
“race riot” is very limited, I will only refer to it when I look at contemporary self -descriptions. For ana-
lytical purposes I will use the term racially coded street violence. 
5 Michael Omi/Howard Winant, Racial Formation in the United States, New York 2014, p. 13 and 111. 
The authors also underline that there is “a crucial corporeal dimension to the race-concept. Race is ocular 
in an irreducible way” (p. 13). 
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a thing”.6 Three elements make the book of Omi/Winant especially important for the 
argument of this article. First, they see race as a concept which is instrumental in shap-
ing social conflict. Such a racialized social conflict is based on the construction of dif-
ferent types of human bodies.7 As they underline, this conflictual construction of the 
concept of race rests on an application of seemingly biologically based human charac-
teristics (phenotypes). These features are selected for racial signification. Second, they 
thoughtfully stress that race as a marker of difference has permeated all forms of social 
relations in the US and in its recent history.8 Third, they focus on racial formation. This 
is a process by which racial identities are created, lived and changed.9 The key social 
and cultural process which explains how racial formation works are “racial projects”. A 
racial project is simultaneously an “interpretation, representation, or explanation of ra-
cial dynamics, and an effort to reorganize and redistribute resources (….) along partic-
ular racial lines”. Racial projects connect what is meant by race in discursive practices 
and the ways in which society (from its organizations to everyday experiences) is ra-
cially organized, based upon that meaning.10 Through these decentralized, dynamic and 
overlapping “racial projects” racial meaning becomes embedded in institutions and or-
ganizations which, in turn, influence the social and cultural understanding of race.11 
This implicates that there is no monolithic racial project, but “a dense matrix” of racial 
projects in society.12 A racial project can be defined as racist if it creates or reproduces 
patterns of domination based on racial categories.  
Seeing the construction of race and racism as issues deeply embedded in social conflict 
is an important clarification which has far-reaching consequences. This leads to the sec-
ond blind spot in the literature on Chicago 1919. In order to better understand what 
went on in the racially coded violence in the streets of Chicago in summer 1919 it is 
 
6 Laura Tabili, Race is a Relationship, and not a thing, in: Journal of Social History 37,1 (2003), pp. 125-
130. 
7 Omi/Winant, Racial Formation 2014, p. 110. 
8 Omi/Winant, Racial Formation 2014, p. 107. 
9 Omi/Winant, Racial Formation 2014, p. 109. 
10 Omi/Winant; Racial Formation 2014, p. 125. 
11 Omi/Winant, Racial Formation 2014, p. 14. 
12 Omi/Winant, Racial Formation 2014, p. 128. 
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challenging to employ an innovative understanding of conflict which has only been re-
cently elaborated. This perspective was put forward by the author of this article and by 
other members of the Bielefeld Collaborative Research Center (SFB 1288 Praktiken des 
Vergleichens. Die Welt ordnen und verändern / Practices of Comparing. Ordering and 
Changing the World), established 2017.13 This interpretation includes two methodolog-
ical innovations. On the one hand, an understanding of conflict is employed which puts 
the triadic relationship between perpetrator-victim-third party/audience center stage. 
For the construction of race understood as social conflict such a triadic interaction in-
volves a) the person or institution which labels another person as inferior, b) the target 
person of this labelling process and c) the third party or audience, be it physically pre-
sent (bystanders) or not. Moreover, in this approach physical violence is seen as a pat-
tern of communication which also should be analyzed in the triangle between perpe-
trator-victim-third party/audience. As we still lack studies which help to elaborate dif-
ferentiations regarding the third party/audience. 14  
On the other hand, it should be an academic common place that race is put into effect 
through innumerable recurring practices in which comparing is omnipresent. In a nut-
shell: One cannot talk about race and racism without doing comparisons. The latter can 
create order but can also set dynamics in motion which can lead to new patterns of 
order. Omi/Winant, however, do not pay any attention to (practices of) comparing. 
From practice theoretical perspective, routines, repetitions, symbols and so on are in-
strumental in this process of ordering and re-ordering.15 When we consider that race 
and racism could also be understood as efforts to create order, the years immediately 
 
13 See Klaus Weinhauer/Dagmar Ellerbrock, Perspektiven auf Gewalt in europäischen Städten seit dem 
19. Jahrhundert, in: Informationen zur modernen Stadtgeschichte 2/2013, pp. 5-20; Mathias Albert et 
al., Vergleichen unter den Bedingungen von Konflikt und Konkurrenz. Praktiken des Vergleichens. Wor-
king Paper SFB 1288, No. 1, Bielefeld 2019. See for related thoughts on the role of the category “race” 
in the concept of the SFB 1288 Ulrike Davy et al., Grundbegriffe für eine Theorie des Vergleichens. Ein 
Zwischenbericht. Praktiken des Vergleichens. Working Paper SFB 1288, No. 3. Bielefeld 2019, pp. 11-13. 
14 Albert et al., Vergleichen 2019, p. 33. 
15 See for an outline of this approach of the SFB 1288: Angelika Epple/Walter Erhard, Die Welt beobach-
ten – Praktiken des Vergleichens, in: Angelika Epple/Walter Erhard (eds.), Die Welt beobachten. Prak-
tiken des Vergleichens, Frankfurt a. M./New York 2015, pp. 7-31, p. 18; and for a challenging practice 
theoretical approach Angelika Epple, Calling for a practice turn in global history. Practices as drivers of 




following World War One gain special importance. As was mentioned above, this phase 
was shaped by intense sometimes racially coded fears of instability and of social change. 
In this setting in Chicago a quest for a stable urban order was widespread.  
In this brief paper it is certainly impossible to outline the history or the main findings 
of the broad field of research on race, on practice theory or on comparing. My main aim 
is to demonstrate which new insights can be gained about the racially coded street vio-
lence of July and August of 1919 and about related problems, if we employ three inter-
related perspectives, which address the social construction of race and racism based on 
racial projects (1), the triangular setting (perpetrator-victim-audience/third parties) of 
social conflict (including race/racism) and violence, and the study of practices of com-
paring (3).  
After a brief sketch of Chicago’s economy, its housing problems and the racially coded 
street violence of summer 1919 (chapter 2) I will scrutinize racial projects in relevant 
arenas like housing, urban life, labor relations (chapter 3). The Chicago Commission on 
Race Relations (CCRR) established in late 1919 will be analyzed in a longer chapter 
(chapter 4), as it was a highly important player in the field of race relations which 
elaborated suggestions to avoid the recurrence of violent confrontations between whites 
and African-Americans. Due to the high relevancy race and racism had in Chicago in 
1919 and due to the big gaps in related research more space will be devoted to the 
analysis of racial projects than to the study of (practices of) comparing.  
2. Chicago: Economy, housing, racially coded street violence  
Chicago’s economy was shaped by mass production industries (meat, iron and steel, 
railroad), dominated by big companies like Pullman (railroad), Armour and Swift 
(stockyards), and US Steel. It was especially in meatpacking and in the stockyards 
where during the First World War the number of African Americans employees grew 
strongly. In some meatpacking plants, 60-70 percent of the workforce were African 
Americans. Chicago’s African American population more than doubled between 1910 
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and 1920, when the federal census counted roughly 110,000 African American inhab-
itants.16 Some 90 percent of them lived in the Black Belt of South Side Chicago, where 
between 1910 and 1920 the number of African American inhabitants nearly tripled. 
From 27 July to 2 August 1919 a series of events of racially coded street violence shook 
the city.17 These confrontations left 38 people dead (among them 14 whites), 547 in-
jured (342 African Americans and 205 whites), and more than thousand homeless. The 
key incident was the drowning of an African American boy whose raft had drifted over 
an imagined dividing line into a beach section of whites. In the neighborhood where 
most African Americans lived, the “Black Belt”, rumors spread that the boy had been 
held under water by whites. The violence escalated until the next day. Bricks, stones 
and other missiles were thrown, and guns were fired.18 By Wednesday, July 30, the 
“riot” had quieted significantly. Violence was further minimized by the arrival of state 
militia. By Thursday morning, Governor Frank Lowden declared the situation to be un-
der control.  
During the racially coded confrontations, whites went into African-American neighbor-
hoods, mostly armed with bricks, stones, baseball bats, iron bars, hammers, but also 
with guns. African Americans defended themselves with firearms and knives.19 Groups 
of whites drove into African-American neighborhoods with cars firing randomly at 
houses, windows, and African-American passers-by.20 The greatest number of injuries 
occurred west of Wentworth Avenue in the Stockyard district, followed by the Black 
Belt district21. Main thoroughfares witnessed 76 per cent of the injuries on the South 
 
16 Tuttle, Race Riot 1970, p. 76. 
17 See as a still very good overview Tuttle, Race Riot 1970; and as the relevant source Chicago Commis-
sion on Race Relation, The Negro in Chicago. A study in race relations and a race riot, Chicago 1922. 
18 Tuttle, Race Riot 1970, S. 175; CCRR Report 1922, p. 536. 
19 Tuttle, Race riot 1970, p. 34. 
20 CCRR Report 1922, p. 598. For the micro structure of the violence see CCRR Report 1922, pp. 48-50. 
21 CCRR Report 1922, p. 48f. 
8 
 
Side, where transfer corners “were always centers of trouble”.22 During the “riot” Afri-
can Americans fought back and showed “a growing race solidarity”23 but also a “deep-
ened bitterness of race feeling”.24 
Racially coded violence in Chicago did not only erupt as late as summer 1919. There 
was a series of open clashes between whites and African Americans which started in 
early 1917.25 Some of them were confrontations between groups of whites and African 
Americans but there were bombings against homes of African Americans and against 
real estate agents who had business with them as well. Seven bombings had happened 
in the six weeks preceding the “riot”.26 The bombings and the low profile the police kept 
in countering this violence, intensified the lack of trust African Americans had towards 
the police and supported their impulses for armed self-defense. 
3. Racial Projects in Chicago 1919 
3.1 Housing and urban life 
From 1916 to 1919 some 50,000 African Americans migrated to Chicago, mostly from 
southern regions. The war had accelerated a long-term process of migration from the 
South to northern US cities. In Chicago the migration confronted rural workers who 
mostly had worked in agriculture with a double challenge: Living in a big city and work-
ing as a proletarian in highly industrialized branches. As nearly no houses had been 
built in wartime Chicago, migration contributed to a shortage of housing opportunities.  
In Chicago in 1919 social fears about change were the main element of the racial project 
which drove the racially coded social conflicts about housing in the cities’ white neigh-
borhoods. These fears, which were present in individual actions and also shaped the 
activities of social organizations, were focused on three aspects.27 Generally white in-
 
22 CCRR Report 1922, p. 49. 
23 CCRR Report 1922, p. 46. 
24 CCRR Report 1922, p. 46. 
25 CCRR Report 1922, pp. 53-57. 
26 Tuttle, Race Riot 1970, p.182. 
27 See for the following CCRR Report 1922, pp. 194-224. 
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habitants were terrified by the imagination that African Americans might buy residen-
tial property in their area. Moreover, white inhabitants feared the erosion of racial ho-
mogeneity in their neighborhood. Additionally, whites were convinced that the growing 
presence of African Americans who bought houses in white neighborhoods would inev-
itably lead to a massive loss in property value (depreciation) in these areas.  
These social fears whites articulated were often abstract imaginaries which did not need 
concrete physical encounters with African Americans. In this abstraction the temporal 
comparison between a racial homogeneity before and after African Americans had 
moved into formerly all-white neighborhoods might be seen as a special case of com-
paring, that means it is more an analogy comparing a structural quality of the neigh-
borhood (its racial homogeneity).28 This analogy consisted of the comparata whites ver-
sus African Americans and the tertia was the abstract quality of life in the neighborhood. 
Additionally, through comparing property values whites tried to create a seemingly ob-
jective argument to ban African Americans from their neighborhood. This was also an 
effort to create order and to stop local social change in a seemingly ever-changing urban 
setting.29 
The social organizations which helped to formulate and to put these comparisons into 
social action were homeowner associations. These organizations which tried to fight the 
presence of African Americans contributed strongly to establish the racialized narratives 
about depreciation. Initially these fears were communicated mainly on meetings of local 
homeowners. This local audience, the third party in this process of communication in a 
racially coded social conflict, was widened when, as mentioned above, bombs exploded 
which were targeted at African American residences in formerly all-white neighbor-
hoods and at offices of realtors who had cooperated with African Americans.30 These 
bombings were picked-up widely by the white and African American press in Chicago. 
 
28 See on analogies Davy et al., Grundbegriffe 2019, pp. 31-36. 
29 As research has demonstrated there were many more factors that influenced property value (local 
housing policy, the quality of public transport, the moving in and out of industries, the physical deterio-
ration of old buildings). See CCRR Report 1922, pp. 194-214; St. Clair Drake/Horace C. Cayton, Black 
Metropolis. A study of negro life in a northern city, New York 1945; Arnold R. Hirsch, Making the Second 
Ghetto. Race and Housing in Chicago, 1940-1960, Cambridge etc. 1983. 
30 Tuttle, Race Riot 1970, p. 159 and p. 250.  
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The press was no passive audience. The newspapers were an active third party which 
helped to create translocal audiences and also formulated their own interpretations of 
racism.  
As a thorough analysis of the newspaper coverage which was related to African Ameri-
cans in 1919 Chicago indicated: Most of the published information “concerning the Ne-
gro (sic!) and issues related to him (sic!) magnifies his crimes and mistakes beyond all 
reasonable proportions (….). Crimes, riots, intermarriage, lynchings, and radicalism 
were the subjects of articles, which in their repetition … presented a disproportionately 
unfavorable aspect of the Negro population”.31 Many newspapers in 1919/20 “play(ed) 
upon racial fears” thus increasing the racially coded social tensions. Chicago newspa-
pers were also quick to turn public encounters where whites and African Americans 
yelled at each other or fist fights between them into riots incited be African Americans.32 
The racial project which shaped racism in the field of housing was centered on often 
abstract social fears about the erosion of racial homogeneity (supported through seem-
ingly objectified arguments about depreciation). In social micro settings (public space, 
public transport, in bars and restaurants) the more concrete encounters and interactions 
were differently racialized. In restaurants and bars the discriminatory racial project was 
put into effect by waiters and shop managers, and the third party was a highly localized 
audience present in these locations. When African Americans wanted to dine in restau-
rants which saw themselves as an all-white location, a wide range of strategies were 
employed: the non-white guests were not admitted, service was massively delayed, or 
food was spoilt. Moreover, when African Americans were admitted to dine, screens were 
put around the tables where they ate.33 In these micro settings where there was physical 
contact between whites and African Americans the racial project was shaped by implicit 
comparisons which tried to uphold racial homogeneity. This was supported by trying to 
make African American guests invisible by putting micro fences around them and thus 
putting an optical segregation into practice. 
 
31 CCCR Report 1922, p. 531f. See for details of the press coverage of the bombings ibid., p. 532-537. 
32 See CCCR 1922, p. 542. 
33 CCRR Report 1922, pp. 312-316. 
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Public transport in Chicago had no separation of seats. Before the First World War Af-
rican Americans were mostly employed on personal service, jobs for which they only 
very seldom needed to use public transport. The thousands of African Americans who 
came from the South in the context of war induced migration, however, lived in neigh-
borhoods situated far away from their workplace in, for example, the stockyards. Thus, 
they had to make intensive use of public transportation. Many whites had only very few 
contacts with African Americans, but public transport was the exception from that rule. 
Mainly in crowded street cars the racially coded bodies came into close physical contact. 
As these contacts were not supervised, as for example in schools, confrontational situa-
tions could easily escalate and observations of the alleged behavior of African Ameri-
cans or of whites could have lasting impacts on individual memory.34 The complaints 
raised by white customers, mostly from middle class members and clerical workers,35 
were mainly about ill-smelling African Americans or about the loud conversations of 
the latter or their lack of body control. Similar to the case of restaurants and bars, these 
racist interactions in the face of even closer physical contact were driven by fears of an 
unspecified contagion. These white customers also wanted to make African Americans 
invisible. 
Another racial project was put into practice on the streets of the neighborhoods which 
were adjacent to the Black Belt, the part of the city where most of the African Americans 
lived at that time. Wentworth Avenue was a highly contested demarcation line. It 
marked the eastern boundary of the mostly Irish catholic and the western boundary of 
the protestant Black Belt neighborhood.36 African Americans had to walk through these 
precincts on the way to their workplaces. Key players in this racial project were street-
gangs or athletic clubs, which often were closely related to Democratic politicians. The 
implicit comparisons in these cases of physical contact and sometimes even physical 
confrontations made by these gangs and clubs, which should better be understood as 
 
34 CCRR Report 1922, p. 619. 
35 CCRR Report 1922, p. 621. 
36 See Lamberti, Riot Zone 2013, pp. 134-140; CCRR Report 1922, pp. 7-13. 
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social movements,37 were centered on an imaginary of an all-white local urban territory 
of mostly Catholic Irish and Polish inhabitants.38 Their way to put these comparisons 
into action included not only verbal intimidation but massive physical violence as well. 
This was a confrontation mainly shaped by working-class racism, where proletarians 
fought about local urban order against proletarians. 
At stake in these physical confrontations were not mainly work-related issues. These 
fights were about leisure and consumption in public space like the use of public meeting 
places, recreational facilities, cinemas, and bars. This underlines that in these urban 
neighborhoods not only housing was a racially contested terrain. Rather, many aspects 
of urban space were deeply racially coded, as the gangs and clubs saw themselves as 
the defenders of gendered and racially coded urban spatial micro order. In these racist 
confrontations with African Americans the gangs and clubs could also document that 
they were white and were locally rooted and not uprooted migrants coming from the 
south. Thus, through these violent conflicts the ethnic Irish and Polish inhabitants could 
publicly create their “wages of whiteness”39. Through this they publicly demonstrated: 
We are white and we are allowed to punish all non-white intruders. The audiences to 
which these racialized confrontations were communicated were the white citizens of 
the local neighborhood. The sympathies of this supportive local third party/audience 
given - be it physically present or imagined - made it possible for the white collectives 
to self-consciously and mercilessly drive their African American enemies out of their 
turf. 
3.2 Labor relations: labor market, shop-floor, unions 
Chicago’s employers already tried to bring more African American workers into the 
stockyards before the war.40 For this purpose they used their links with the two most 
 
37 This interpretation is put forward by Klaus Weinhauer, World War I and Urban Societies: Social move-
ments, fears, and spatial order in Hamburg and Chicago (c. 1916-23), in: Rinke/Wildt (eds.), Revolutions 
2017, pp. 287-306, p. 302f. 
38 Lamberti, Riot Zone 2013, chapter 2. 
39 David Roediger, The Wages of Whiteness. Race and the making of the American working class, London 
1991. 
40 Halpern, Killing Floor 1997, p. 59. 
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important African American civil society organizations, the Young Men’s Christian As-
sociation (YMCA) and the Urban League. At numerous opportunities, employers had 
used African American workers to undermine strikes in the stockyard and meatpacking 
houses (1894, 1904) of white workers. The war, however, challenged these established 
patterns of segregation. On the one hand, the war increased the demand for meat in 
order to feed the soldiers. On the other hand, immigration from Europe between 1914 
and 1918 dropped by 80 percent. Together with domestic conscription this created a 
severe labor shortage. Third, in this setting the migration of African American workers 
from the south, as indicated above, brought new workers but also new challenges to 
the loyalties towards skill, ethnicity and race. 
It would be wrong to speak of only one racial project in labor relations. Until now this 
has not been sufficiently recognized by most labor history studies. If we look at the 
stockyards and meat packinghouses, among the biggest employers in Chicago, the racial 
projects shaping the labor relations of this industry had a highly complex network of 
hierarchically structured players and third parties/audiences, as the workforce was di-
vided by skill, ethnicity and race.41 While the comparata workers used in their implicit 
comparisons were white workers on the one side and African American workers on the 
other, they used a variety of tertia, which were very often focused on work discipline 
and productivity. Workplace based racism against African American workers was ex-
pressed through several derogatory categories. White workers deemed African Ameri-
cans as undisciplined, and as lacking output-oriented work ethics. They also put their 
experience as urban workers against the rural origins of those African Americans re-
cently migrated to Chicago from the South. The third party/audience was also highly 
fragmented. Racism could stay confined to workgroups in what David Montgomery re-
ferred to as ‘the foreman’s empire’42 at the shop floor but could also diffuse beyond the 
factory or workplace, into union meetings and neighborhoods. In these settings the 
 
41 Halpern, Killing Floor 1997, pp.44-48. 
42 David Montgomery, The Fall of the House of Labor. The workplace, the state, and American labor 
activism, 1865-1925, Cambridge 1989, p. 115. 
14 
 
work-related racism could mix with racist communications of the racial projects of other 
social arenas. 
In confrontations between whites and African Americans on the shop floor, knives and 
revolvers were used. Thus, as the key study underlined, the “riot” of 1919 was also a 
”violent outcrop of the long-standing discord between white and black job competi-
tors.43 During the “riot” itself there were only very few violent confrontations in the 
stockyards where the highest number of African Americans were employed. As a closer 
look indicates, however, the absence of violence in this case was due to the fact, that 
only very few African Americans had made it to their jobs, as it was nearly impossible 
to reach them by walking through hostile white neighborhoods.44 
All in all, in the Chicago labor movement, “racism was the norm, not the exception”.45 
A week before the racially coded street violence in summer 1919, ten thousand stock-
yard workers walked off their jobs in order to protest against the presence of non-un-
ionized African Americans.46 In the stockyards of summer 1919 the unwillingness 
among African Americans to join a union was very present. This was especially true for 
those who had recently migrated to Chicago. While in 1919 nearly 90 per cent of the 
Northern-born African Americans stockyard workers were unionized, only very few of 
the big numbers of recent migrants from the South were.47 After the “riot” and in face 
of economic depression the shop floor violence between white and African American 
workers escalated.48 At that critical time phase “white workers increasingly viewed non-
union black workers as a dire economic, social, and even physical threat”.49 African 
Americans did not want to jeopardize their new jobs by joining a union. White workers 
also viewed African Americans as strike breakers and thus willing tools of the employ-
ers. The racial projects in labor relations were centered, among others, around skill, 
ethnicity, work discipline, and productivity. In this context, union membership pitted 
 
43 Tuttle, Race Riot 1970, p. 109. 
44 Tuttle, Race Riot 1970, p. 110. 
45 Tuttle, Race Riot 1970, p. 145. 
46 Halpern, Killing Floor 1997, p. 62; Bates, Jungle 2019, p.116. 
47 Tuttle, Race Riot 1970, p. 147. 
48 Bates, Jungle 2019, p.117f. 
49 Bates, Jungle 2019, p. 117. 
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workers against each other, thus blurring the tensions between workers on the one side 
and employers and their staff on the other. The field of labor relations was so complex 
a setting of racial formation that it is hard to generalize which racial project was domi-
nant. 
4. The Chicago Commission on Race Relations (CCRR): Racial projects and practices of  
comparing 
Given the complex set of interacting and overlapping racial projects in Chicago, it is 
interesting to ask which proposals were elaborated to avoid further violent escalations 
after the summer of 1919. The main focus of this chapter will be on the committee 
which was put together to study the causes of the Chicago “race riot” of July and August 
1919. The first meeting of this Chicago Commission on Race Relations (CCRR) was held 
October 9, 1919; its report was published in September 1922. The main initiative came 
from a meeting of representatives of social organizations on August 1, 1919. On August 
20, Governor Frank O. Lowden announced the appointment of such a body with white 
and African American members. CCRR put together a “pioneering sociological analy-
sis”.50 It followed the impulses given by the at that time (1899) path-breaking publica-
tion of W.E.B. Du Bois.51 This close relationship also becomes obvious if we look at the 
title of the report of the Commission, “The Negro in Chicago”. Du Bois’ study was titled 
“The Philadelphia Negro”.52 The CCRR studied the living and working conditions of 
African Americans in Chicago, analyzed existing data while also new source materials 
were collected, hearings were organized and field work research was carried out. Six 
sub-committees were organized which focused on “Racial Clashes”, “Racial Contacts”, 
Housing, Industry, Crime, and Public Opinion.53  
One should not forget, that the Commission was also a player in the field of racialized 
social relations in Chicago. With its numerous hearings, interviews, and press reports it 
 
50 Paul M. Bulmer, Charles S. Johnson, Robert E. Park and the research methods of the Chicago Commis-
sion on Race Relations 1919-22: An early experiment in applied social research, in: Ethnic and Racial 
Studies 4 (1981), pp. 289-306, p. 289. 
51 W.E.B. Du Bois, The Philadelphia Negro. A social study, Philadelphia, Pa. 1899. 
52 Ibid. 
53 CCRR Report 1922, p. XVII. 
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added to the existing racial projects and it did that by communicating to regional or 
even national third parties/audiences, which included academic third parties/audi-
ences. As indicated in the first section of this article, a racial project simultaneously 
interprets what is meant by race and (re-)organizes social resources along racial divi-
sions and, as a consequence, racial meaning becomes embedded in institutions, organ-
izations and in every day routines. All this in turn, influences the social and cultural 
understanding of race.  
The personnel structure of the Commission underlined that there were two races, as its 
staff was explicitly subdivided into white and into African American members. Thus the 
“state put the official stamp on racial difference”.54 With this assumption of similarity 
(Gleichartigkeitsannahme) that there are two distinct races (‘white’ and ‘negro’) these 
differences were naturalized. Although the report differentiates among the whites be-
tween many ethnic groups (Italians, Irish, Poles) and among African Americans be-
tween those how lived longer in Chicago and the new migrants from the south, the 
overall argument speaks of two races.  
One leading juror from the jury set up after the clashes of summer 1919 found a prag-
matic solution to overcome racial tensions in Chicago through a ‘segregation by agree-
ment’: As jury member John P. Brushingham put it:  
“Let the leaders of both peoples come together and agree for the general good 
to dwell apart. Both races will be happier and more prosperous by them-
selves.” In this situation “it might be better for the colored minority to take 
the initiative and say to their white fellow citizens, grant us no special privi-
lege but a square deal; better living conditions, school privileges, housing ac-
commodations and please keep on your own side of the road and we will be 
satisfied”.55 
With this argument, again, it was clear that there were two clearly discernible ‘races’. 
The author even made them into separated peoples (Völker). Although the Commission, 
 
54 Cheryl Hudson, ‘The Negro in Chicago’. Harmony in Conflict, 1919-22, in: European Journal of Amer-
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55 John P. Brushingham, October 31, 1919, Juror in Race Riot coroner’s Jury, Report p. 41, see: 
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as was indicated above, naturalized the existence of two “races” it did not support such 
‘segregation by agreement’. The racial project of the Commission was shaped by an 
ambivalent relational perspective when the issue of race was discussed. In some sections 
of its report, racism was seen as a mere misunderstanding.56 Thus it cannot come as a 
surprise that the Commission tried to achieve “racial harmony”.57 The whole report does 
not mention the words racism or racist. On the one hand, the “race problem” was con-
sidered to be a “Negro problem”58. Thus, the origins of racism were blurred, although it 
was underlined that this problem “is not of the Negro’s making”. On the other hand, 
when the Commission referred to that ‘problem’ it was stated that “every citizen, re-
gardless of color or racial origin, (is) bound to seek and forward its solution”. Moreover, 
in this process rights and duties were seen to be “mutual and equal”.59 At a general 
level, the final responsibility for racial problems was seen to lie at the national level. As 
“the problem is national in its scope and gravity, the solution must be national”.60  
On the following pages I will discuss the solutions the Commission worked out in order 
to combat the racial tensions in Chicago and to avoid the escalation of violence as it 
had happed in summer 1919. First, the Commission put together a list of 59 recommen-
dations to avoid future racial tensions.61 These suggestions were directed towards the 
police and the justice system, city administration, organizations of civil society, to the 
public (white and African American), to the employers and labor organizations, public 
transport companies and to restaurants, theaters and so on, and to the press. All of them 
should be better organized and avoid racial prejudices and discriminatory practices. 
Housing and sanitation should be improved.   
Second, the Commission hoped that education was an important way to avoid racial 
tensions. This education could only be put into practice on a national level, where “the 
nation must make sure that the Negro is educated for citizenship”.62 It was also claimed 
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that if all white and all African American leaders would educate their followers that 
racism would disappear (and I would add: but the system of two races persisted):  
“Both races need to understand…. that relations of amity are the only protec-
tion against race clashes; that these relations cannot be forced, but will come 
naturally as the leaders of each race develop within their own ranks a reali-
zation of the gravity of this problem and a vital interest in its solution, and an 
attitude of confidence, respect, and friendliness toward the people of the 
other race.”63  
As the findings of the report indicate, the education system in Chicago was massively 
shaped by racism. Putting any hope in the potentially anti-racist qualities of this system 
is more than irritating. 
Generally, the report of the Commission put high hopes on social evolution. Using a 
progressive comparison, in this case in an evolutionary form, it was pointed out, the 
“Negro race must develop, as all races have developed, from lower to higher planes of 
living; and must base its progress upon industry, efficiency, and moral character”.64 This 
argument was influenced by the famous Chicago based urban sociologist Robert E. Park 
and especially by one of his scholars, Charles S. Johnson.65 As indicated above, the in-
fluence of social Darwinism with its hierarchy of races and the idea that races differed 
in mental and physical characteristics was present. This was combined with the “race 
relations cycle” which described the evolution of the races in four steps. This cycle had 
the stages of competition, conflict, accommodation and had its end point in the assim-
ilation of the races.66 As especially the elements ‘competition’ and ‘conflict’ underline 
this cycle was shaped by comparisons. 
Two other progressive comparisons made in the report of the Commission underline 
the abstract trust in social evolution, and also make it more explicit and precise. First, 
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there was a trust in the democratic potentials of urban live (1). This urbanized evolu-
tionary social-political progress would also breed an advanced masculine rationality 
(2).  
First, in a progressive comparison with the comparata urban lifestyle in Chicago (a) and 
rural patterns of living (b) city life was seen as a much more advanced way of living. 
Without any doubt urban life was deemed to pave the way for social and political pro-
gress based on progressive rationality (tertia). This, for example, becomes obvious, in 
the section of the report which analyzes the former life African Americans migrants had 
left on their way from the South to Chicago.67 Although the housing conditions they 
had to face in Chicago were sharply criticized, it was seemingly inevitable that they 
would change to the better over time. Moreover, city life would contribute to a process 
of progress by educating African Americans. When the rural migrants, the Commission 
mainly referred to male migrants, had themselves adjusted to the more rational urban 
lifestyle, they would be much better able to control their emotions and to employ more 
disciplined work ethics. This process of progress would dominate over and slowly erad-
icate the much-criticized mentality of casual laborers freely switching between phases 
of extensive leisure and of hard work.68  
Second, in another progressive comparison which had urban rationality (as indicator of 
progress) as a tertia, the violence employed in the Chicago “riot” was compared with 
earlier „racial outbreaks“.69 The Chicago “riot” did not see emotional excitement about 
the harassment of women or about other sexually coded crimes allegedly committed by 
African Americans.70 This had been the case in Springfield in August 1908 or in East St. 
Louis in May and July 1917.71 Moreover, it was stressed that in Chicago in summer 
1919 there had been no hangings, burnings, and mutilations of African Americans.72 
These arguments support the interpretation that the Commission was convinced that 
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the Chicago case, although people were killed and injured, was very different from other 
“race riots”. The violence committed in Chicago was more rational – although it re-
mained very ambivalent.  
The violent street actions during the of summer 1919 were neither aimed at torturing 
nor mutilating African Americans. In this narrative, the northern whites behaved more 
rational than their rural and/or southern fellows. In the streets of Chicago, whites and 
African Americans were, as I have mentioned above, armed with guns, bats, clubs etc. 
but the violence that was employed in Chicago was less archaic than the one employed 
in the South.73 The violent street clashes between African Americans and whites surely 
did cause a death toll but it was an open manly contest. Risks lay on both sides: attack-
ers as well as the attacked could be severely hurt or could die.  
The CCRR’s progressive comparison focused on urban-based social-political progress 
and advanced masculine rationality, however, could only be sustained, if some im-
portant violent players of the racially coded clashes in the summer of 1919 were ex-
cluded. This exclusion was put into practice through a, what I would call, hoodlum 
narrative. At its center stood „gangs of hoodlums“74 which were deemed to be respon-
sible for most of the emotionally driven uncontrolled violent acts. They were supported 
by and closely related to “athletic clubs” (Ragen’s Colts, Lotus Club, Mayflower).75 These 
‘gangs of hoodlums’ often were the driving forces in leading what the Commission la-
belled mobs.76 Although the report indicated, that gangs and athletic clubs often vio-
lently expressed what the surrounding white community felt,77 during the riot these 
entities through their massive employment of uncontrolled violence had crossed a red 
line. This lack of rational self-control excluded them from the rationality of urban life. 
 
73 CCRR Report 1922, pp. 79-85. Among the 52 deaths which occurred on the streets of Chicago (one 
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For the Commission they were elements of the past, no harbingers of an urbanized 
rational future. 
In studying the report of the CCRR it becomes obvious that not only the violence whites 
employed was manly coded and rational. In view of the Commission, African Americans 
in 1919 Chicago, too, acted in a masculine and rational manner. They armed themselves 
(also with guns) and they fought back in open confrontations. This militant and mas-
culine self-defense was a pattern of action of African Americans, which in this intensity 
did surface for the first time in 1919 and was publicly discussed.78 This militant, mas-
culine self-defense was motivated by several factors. Generally, in the US there was 
what Jörn Leonhard describes as a “revolution of rising expectations”79: soldiers who 
had fought in the First Word War expected to receive not only respect and recognition 
from their nation but hoped for social political gains and improved political participa-
tion as well.  
In Chicago, the African American 8th Infantry regiment whose soldiers had recently re-
turned from French battlefields80 contributed to a new spirit and practice of armed self-
defense. These veterans organized what an eye witness retrospectively called in refer-
ring to his experiences in World War One a “Hindenburg-line” of organized groups.81 In 
this implicit comparison of defense tactics between fighting in a war and fighting in an 
US-American domestic social conflict the dividing line between external and internal 
affairs was eroded.  
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Moreover, in Chicago through armed self-defense82, many African Americans echoed 
and put into practice, the statement W.E.B. Du Bois had given in a famous issue of the 
journal “Crisis” in May 1919: 
“… we are cowards and jackasses if now that that war is over, we do not 
marshal every ounce of our brain and brawn to fight a sterner, longer, more 
unbending battle against the forces of hell in our own land. We return. We 
return from fighting. We return fighting. Make way for Democracy!” 83 
This practice of comparing, too, signaled that it had become imaginable that the divid-
ing line between external and internal struggles of nation states had become permeable. 
84 Future studies will have to find out if and how far this war-induced erosion contrib-
uted to a decay of the stability of nation states and promoted social change (incl. revo-
lutions). Such transnationally oriented studies would help to contextualize the racially 
coded street violence in Chicago in the summer of 1919 into a wider global setting of 
social change.  
 4. Conclusion 
This paper has elaborated first steps towards an approach which can help to generate 
new insights about the racially coded street violence of July and August of 1919 and 
about related problems. Three interrelated perspectives were integrated: the social con-
struction of race and racism based on racial projects (1), the triangular setting (perpe-
trator-victim-audience/third parties) of social conflict (including race/racism) and vio-
lence, and the study of practices of comparing (3). In 1919 there was a widely shared 
assumption of similarity (Gleichartigkeitsannahme), that there are two distinct races 
(‘white’ and ‘negro’). In the racial projects considered in this article these entities were 
naturalized, no further differentiations were made. Generally, this brief study has 
shown that race and with its race-related practices of comparing were deeply encoded 
in different sections of urban society and in social organizations in Chicago. Racial pro-
jects were present in housing, on public streets and places, in public transport, on the 
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shop-floor, in labor unions, in the press and also in the Chicago Commission on Race 
Relations. The field of labor relations was so complex a setting of racial formation that 
it is hard to generalize which racial project was dominant. The racial projects elaborated 
in the case of Chicago addressed different third parties/audiences. The press was a not 
a passive audience. On the one hand, the press was an active third party which played 
an important role in communicating the often localized patterns of racism to translocal 
audiences. On the other hand, in doing this, the newspapers often added their own 
interpretations of racism and gave impulses to see racial differences as unchangeable. 
As also the racial projects formulated in the report of the CCRR indicated, the construc-
tion of race was explicitly based on practices of comparing. The latter were shaped by 
progressive comparisons which focused on trust in urban-based social-political progress 
and in advanced masculine rationality. These two patterns (urban progress and mascu-
line rationality) help to explain why the CCCR did not elaborate more far-reaching pro-
posals to overcome racism and its potential of violent escalations.  
The practices of comparing used by (white) local social actors in Chicago tried to bring 
order and stability to an urban society whose members felt themselves threatened 
through massive social change induced by World War One. The study of practices of 
comparing indicated, that in 1919 it had become imaginable that the dividing line be-
tween external and internal struggles of nation states had become permeable. Globally 
this war-induced erosion might have further contributed to a decay of the stability of 
nation states and thus also could have accelerated social change (incl. revolutions) on 
a larger scale. Taken together, however, urban order and urban masculine rationality 
seemed to pave the way towards a more peaceful future, in which the system of two 
races persisted but racism had disappeared. 
PROJECT AREA A – CONFLICT AND COMPETITION
By placing the act of comparing at the heart of the SFB, it 
focuses on a practice that has multiple shapes and forms. 
Therefore, the projects pay particular attention to situations 
and contexts in which comparing can be performed in many 
different ways. Those who see themselves in direct competi-
tion with others and have to make decisions compare differ-
ently than writers of fiction or scientists, for instance, whose 
comparisons do not immediately result in concrete actions.
Project area A focuses on practices of comparing in situations 
of conflict and competition. Do different practices of compari-
son get formed in situations of conflict or competition as well 
as in social spaces of (self-)reflexivity? Do some cases evoke 
looking for differences and others for commonalities?
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SFB 1288 – PRACTICES OF COMPARING
Our everyday life is shaped by ratings, statistics and competition, 
whether it is sports, politics or science. To compare is believed to be 
objective. It supposedly helps us to obtain clear results. But how neu-
tral is it to compare?
People compare themselves regarding their qualities and skills, com-
panies compare their finances, countries their gross domestic product. 
To compare, for instance, influences how we perceive the other: Is it 
similarities or differences that get to stand out? Which judgements do 
we reach? When and why do habitual opinions sneak into the allegedly 
impartial act of comparing?
Researchers working in fields of history, literary studies, philosophy, 
art history, political science and law are for the first time studying how 
comparative practices order and change the world. The Collaborative 
Research Centre (SFB) 1288 “Practices of Comparing“ is conducting 
fundamental research by shifting the focus from ‘the comparison’ to a 
‘practice of comparing’: What do agents do when they compare?
One objective is to raise awareness to the fact that the allegedly natu-
ral practice of comparing is never innocent, objective or neutral.
By studying an essential practice of order and dynamics in modern but 
also premodern, European and non-European societies, the SFB aims 
to contribute to a model for rethinking history, societies and historical 
change in the context of the latest historical and cultural theories.
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